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Abstract 
Current acquisitions, logistics, and system sustainment practices in the U.S. 
Navy are not fully capitalizing on commercial-sector best practices.  In addition, the 
Navy does not have a consistent approach to system maintenance and sustainment. 
Could the maintenance free operating period (MFOP) approach be a game 
changer?  This paper evaluates the potential impact of MFOP principles on 
processes, procedures, and costs in acquisition planning. It investigates MFOP and 
reviews the results of a 2005 submarine pilot program and the 2009 surface ship 
demonstration involving the concept. 
Keywords: Maintenance free operating period, MFOP, acquisition planning, 
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I. Introduction 
The U.S. Navy has been transforming traditional business practices through 
the adoption of open architecture (OA) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
technologies. Billions of dollars in software and hardware development expenditures, 
along with subsequent maintenance costs, are at stake with the migration to an OA 
business model.  The adoption of an enterprise-wide business model and product 
line strategy that leverages “open” computer design principles and architectures to 
deliver cost-effective, innovative, and rapid/spiral acquisition capabilities has 
resulted in a number of significant benefits to the Navy. 
The OA business model, however, has not permeated into current acquisition 
approaches and system sustainment practices.  Moreover, the naval enterprise does 
not employ a consistent approach to system maintenance and sustainment. Could 
the maintenance free operating period (MFOP) approach be a game changer in the 
acquisitions, logistics, and system sustainment processes?  Could the MFOP help 
achieve significant cost reductions while providing dramatic operational 
improvement?   
MFOP is defined as a period of operation during which an aircraft is able to 
carry out its assigned missions without the need for any maintenance except pre-
defined flight servicing and role change activities. It is a period with no required, 
emergency, or unexpected maintenance.  Following each MFOP is a maintenance 
recovery period (MRP) in which maintenance is done to ensure that the system is 
recovered to complete the next MFOP cycle.  The MFOP concept could be applied 
in system maintenance, logistics, acquisitions, and sustainment practices. 
 A research team from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) investigated the 
MFOP concept and analyzed the initial 2005 submarine MFOP pilot and the 
subsequent 2009 surface ship demonstration. The goal of this project was to assist 
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procedures, and costs in acquisition planning. The scope of the research was to 
compare the efficacy of the MFOP and traditional integrated logistics support (ILS) 
life-cycle methods and to potentially quantify relative cost performance from the two 
demonstrations.  However, there were several limitations to this study.  First, 
secondary research methodologies were primarily used and data on the MFOP 
projects was to be supplied by the sponsor. 
In this paper, we present the results of the project. The paper begins with 
background information on the acquisitions process in the U.S. Section III provides 
an introduction to integrated logistics support.  In Section IV, we then highlight some 
of the significant challenges for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) such as reduced budgets, escalating shipbuilding 
costs, and soaring life-cycle costs. In Section V, we discuss Naval Open Architecture 
and its successor, open systems architecture.  In Section VI, we introduce the 
concept of the MFOP.  In this section, we discuss the introduction of the MFOP in 
the late 1990s, potential applications, potential benefits, and applications of the 
MFOP in several projects.  In Section VII, we discuss the MFOP pilot and 
demonstration by the DoN that exceeded initial expectations.  In Section VIII, we 
summarize some of the MFOP models that have been developed over the years. In 
this section, we also summarize some of the diverse efforts to quantify and develop 
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II. Defense Acquisitions 
The United States has the largest national defense budget in the world.  In 
2007, the defense budget was $660 billion and equivalent to the next 45 highest 
spending nations combined (Gray, 2009, p. 212).  Figure 1 shows the national 
defense expenditures in 14 countries. 
 
Figure 1. Defense Expenditure for the Top Fourteen Countries (2007) 
(Gray, 2009, p. 213) 
U.S. expenditures on defense represented 4.6% of national gross domestic 
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Figure 2. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP 
(Gray, 2009, p. 214.) 
Note. * Fiscal year (FY) in which most months fall in 2007. Australia is average of 2006/2007 and 
2007/2008, corresponding to calendar year;  
** Real U.S. FY2009; 
*** Based on publically available project data (i.e., 96 U.S. projects, 30 Australia projects, 37 Japan 
projects);  
^ For consistency of sources, NATO figures are used. ^^ 2008 figure; ^^^ 2006 figure. 
 
Acquisitions in the United States are a result of a complex process involving 
many organizations. In the past, procurement has been performed by the individual 
services, and the trend in recent years has been a movement to joint capabilities 
integration and development.1  The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
reviews programs while the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) assesses 
capabilities gaps and proposals. Overseeing defense acquisitions across various 
organizations is the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). Working directly with suppliers, selecting 
contractors, writing contracts, and monitoring contractors’ performance is the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Logistics support is provided by 
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA; Gray, 2009, p. 216). 
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The procurement process is divided into several phases: Capabilities 
Assessment; Materiel Solution Analysis; Technology Development; Integrated 
System Design: System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration; and 
Production & Deployment (Gray, 2009, p. 216). Figure 3 is an overview of the 
acquisitions process. Transitions from phases are decided by a materiel 
development decision (MDD) review, milestone review, or design review. 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the Acquisition Process 
(Gray, 2009, p. 217) 
The DoD must make acquisitions that are of high quality, reliable, 
maintainable, and readily available to meet user needs.  End-user needs consist of 
meeting mission capability and operational tasks at reasonable costs.  Moreover, 
these costs are not just initial procurement costs but must extend throughout the 
entire system life cycle to include factors such as maintenance (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense & the Joint Staff, 2009, p. vii). In 2009, the USD(AT&L) issued 
new reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) guidance in DoD Instruction 
(DoDI) 5000.02. The guidance implemented RAM practices to ensure successful 
collaboration between procurement and the acquisition communities in the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 6 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
during program acquisition phases because there is the “risk that programs will 
breach Acquisition Program Baseline thresholds with significantly higher 
development or acquisition costs due to resulting corrective action costs; will cost 
more than anticipated to own and operate; or will fail to provide availability expected 
by the warfighter” (Office of the Secretary of Defense & the Joint Staff, 2009, p. 1). 
Figure 4 shows the significant reliability, availability, and maintainability cost 
(RAM-C) activities conducted during the life cycle.  In addition, the stakeholder 
primarily responsible for that activity is also shown.  
 
Figure 4. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability Cost (RAM-C) Activities  
Throughout the Life Cycle 
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Table 1 provides program phase-level activities related to sustainment 
requirements and measures.  
Table 1. Sustainment Requirements and Measures by Phase 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense & the Joint Staff, 2009, p. vii) 
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III. Integrated Logistics Support 
The DoD spends more than $200 billion a year to provide the Navy, Air Force, 
Army, Marine Corps, and other federal agencies with the full spectrum of logistics, 
acquisition, and other services.  The DoD’s DLA currently manages nine supply 
chains with five million items and supports more than 2,210 weapon systems, along 
with processing an average of 109,751 requisitions and more than 8,985 contracts 
per day.  In the private sector, the agency would rank in the Fortune 500 top 10% of 
companies. 
In FY2010, the DLA spent $210 billion on maintenance, supply, and 
transportation, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. DoD’s Logistics Operations (FY2010) 
(Defense Business Board, 2011) 
A. Integrated Logistics Support 
For the DoN, ILS is defined as a composite of all support considerations 
necessary to ensure effective and economical support for the life cycle of ships, 
systems, and equipment.  ILS’s fundamental objective is to provide life cycle 
support. 
In this broad context, ILS is a disciplined, unified, and interactive approach for 
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 develop support requirements consistent with the design and other 
requirements, 
 integrate these considerations into the design, and 
 provide the required support during the system or equipment life cycle 
at minimum cost. 
ILS incorporates the following elements: 
 Maintenance planning—process conducted to establish maintenance 
and support concepts and requirements for the defense system 
lifetime. The description of requirements and tasks for achieving, 
restoring, or maintaining the operational capability of a system, 
equipment, or facility is in the maintenance plan.  The plan contains the 
performance requirements for each level of maintenance and lists all 
maintenance requirements. 
 Manpower and personnel—people required to operate and support the 
system over its planned life cycle. Manpower and personnel analysis is 
the process conducted to identify and acquire military and civilian 
personnel with the skills and grades required to operate and support 
the system over its planned lifetime at both peacetime and wartime 
rates.  
 Supply support—ensures spares (hardware, components, and 
computer programs) and repair parts required to operate and maintain 
a system provided on a timely basis. Hardware supply support consists 
of a provisioning phase followed by routine replenishment, and 
software supply support must include software and firmware cataloging 
and provisions for routine re-supply of media (e.g., magnetic tapes). 
 Support and test equipment—all equipment (mobile or fixed) required 
to support the operation and maintenance of a materiel system. 
Support equipment consists of ground handling and maintenance 
equipment.  Also includes acquisition of logistics support for support 
equipment.  
 Technical data—all recorded information such as manuals and 
drawings of a scientific or technical nature. Plans include strategy, 
procedures, and schedules for identifying, specifying, preparing, 
collecting, publishing, distributing, updating, and archiving technical 
data related to the end item.  
 Training and training support—processes, procedures, curricula, 
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train civilian and military personnel to operate and support equipment 
and systems. Logistics support must also be provided for the 
installation, operation, and support of devices for required training 
equipment. 
 Computer resources support—includes the facilities, hardware, 
software, documentation, and manpower and personnel needed to 
operate and support embedded computer systems. If required, 
computer hardware and software performance requirements are also 
included.  
 Facilities—permanent, or semi-permanent, real property assets 
required to support a materiel system. Includes studies to define types 
of facilities or facility improvements needed, locations, space needs, 
environmental requirements, and equipment needed in the facility. The 
use of organic depot and intermediate level maintenance activities is 
assessed as well as interim contractor support.  
 Packaging, handling, storage, and transportation (PHS&T)—resources, 
processes, procedures, and design considerations related to the safe 
PHS&T of all systems, equipment, and support items. PHS&T includes 
environmental considerations and equipment preservation 
requirements for short- and long-term storage. Technical instructions 
must be developed to ensure safe packaging, handling, storage, and 
transportation of the end item or its components throughout the life 
cycle.  
 Design interface—primary area of the integration among logistics and 
systems/software engineering functions. Includes design parameters 
such as reliability, maintainability, and supportability. Design interface 
provides product specifications that measure demands on the logistics 
system by system performance rather than inherent technical factors of 
design. (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 2012, p.14-6–14-9) 
Integrated logistics support is a critical challenge, particularly given that 
operating and supporting new ships account for the vast majority of total ownership 
costs (TOC).  The next section discusses some of the challenges that the DoD and 
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IV. Challenges 
The DoD and the DoN are facing a number of significant challenges, including 
reduced budgets, escalating shipbuilding costs, and soaring life-cycle costs.  
A. Shrinking Maintenance Budgets 
In FY2010, the DoD spent approximately $83.7 billion in FY2010 to maintain 
strategic materiel readiness for 13,900 aircraft, 800 strategic missiles, 350,000 
ground combat and tactical vehicles, 283 ships, and myriad other DoD weapon 
systems (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel 
Readiness [OASD(L&MR)], 2011).  Figure 6 shows the systems supported by the 
DoD.  Maintenance was provided through the efforts of approximately 657,000 
military and civilian maintainers and thousands of commercial firms.   
 
 
Figure 6. Systems Supported by DoD Maintenance 
(OASD[L&MR], 2011) 
Performed at several levels, DoD materiel maintenance ranges in complexity 
from daily system inspections to rapid removal and replacement of components to 
complete overhauls or rebuilds of a weapon system. The three levels of 
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extensive work; intermediate-level maintenance for less complex maintenance 
activities performed by operating unit back-shops, base-wide activities, or 
consolidated regional facilities; and field-level maintenance, a combination of depot 
and intermediate levels. 
In early 2011, the DoD operated 17 major depot activities and expended more 
than 98 million direct labor hours (DLHs) annually (Avdellas, Berry, Disano, Oaks, & 
Wingrove, 2011).  Property, plant, and equipment of DoD depots were valued at 
more than $48 billion with an infrastructure consisting of more than 5,600 buildings 
and structures (Avdellas et al., 2011). 
1. Navy Maintenance  
The Navy must maintain and modernize its fleet to achieve full service life of 
current assets.  Maintenance and modernization is essential to derive full benefits of 
current assets and, more importantly, enables the Navy to respond quickly to 
security challenges and offer humanitarian assistance around the world.  In FY2011, 
total ship maintenance amounted to $8.5 billion and is expected to be reduced to 
$7.7 billion by FY2013.  Figure 7 shows the Navy’s maintenance budget. 
 
Figure 7. Department of the Navy Ship Maintenance 
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Maintenance is crucial to maintaining the Navy’s fleet readiness and ensuring 
that the fleet reaches its expected service life.  However, budget reductions in naval 
aircraft depot maintenance will result in a $160 million backlog for aircraft and a 
$217 million backlog for ship maintenance for FY2013 (Greenert, 2012, p. 5).   
2. Impact of Unscheduled Maintenance 
The importance of maintenance is underscored by a 2006 analysis conducted 
by Boeing Corporation of historical data for modern long-range transport aircraft.  In 
that study, unscheduled organizational-level maintenance and depot maintenance 
were found to be the largest contributors to downtime (Andersen & Williams, 2006, 
p. 1).   
Using data from the U.S. Air Force Reliability and Maintainability Information 
System, one-third of aircraft downtime was connected with the aircraft being at the 
depot for inspection and refurbishment, as seen in Figure 8, which shows aircraft 
downtime distributions.  The remaining downtime, a not mission capable (NMC) 
state, was associated with the aircraft not being able to perform any of its missions.  
 
Figure 8. Long-Range Transport Aircraft Downtime Distributions 
(Andersen & Williams, 2006) 
In the NMC state, aircraft were not-mission-capable maintenance (NMCM) 
awaiting maintenance for more than 75% of the time; not-mission-capable supply 
(NMCS) for 15% of this time; and not-mission-capable-both (NMCB) awaiting a 
combination of both maintenance and supply for the remainder of the time. In a 
further analysis of NMCM downtime, 20% was attributed to scheduled maintenance 
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When these categories of downtime are compared in Figure 9, it can be seen 
that unit-level unscheduled maintenance requirements are the largest driver, with 
over 40% of the total aircraft downtime. Depot maintenance accounts for more than 
30% of downtime with remaining downtime distributed among unit-level scheduled 
maintenance, awaiting supply, and awaiting both supply and maintenance. 
 
Figure 9. Long-Range Transport Aircraft Downtime Distributions  
(Andersen & Williams, 2006) 
B. Escalating Shipbuilding Costs 
To become the next generation fleet, the Navy invests approximately $13 
billion per year in shipbuilding, resulting in 41 new construction ships from FY2013 to 
FY2017. Table 2 shows the Navy’s shipbuilding plans. Designed to balance future 
threat capabilities while supporting current irregular warfare operations and maritime 
security and stability operations in the littorals, the shipbuilding budget funds a range 
that includes second Ford class aircraft carrier (CVN 79), the covert Virginia class 
submarine, the multi-mission DDG 51 destroyer, the Littoral Combat Ship, and the 
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Table 2. Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan 
(Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget, p. 5-2) 
 
Naval ships are extremely complex systems requiring design periods of five to 
10 years from concept to start of construction and construction times ranging from 
two to seven years.  Moreover, it will require 30 to 40 years to substantially change 
the Navy’s force architecture with service lives of ships ranging from 25 years for 
smaller, less-complex ships and up to 50 years for aircraft carriers.  
C. Soaring Life-Cycle Costs 
 
The DoD spends billions of dollars each year to operate and support its 
weapon systems. These operating and support (O&S) costs can account for a 
significant portion of a weapon system’s total life-cycle costs and include direct and 
indirect costs of sustaining a fielded system (i.e., maintenance, fuel, spare parts, 
personnel, support facilities, and training equipment). According to the DoD, O&S 
costs incurred after a system has been acquired account for at least 70% of a 
system’s life-cycle costs (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010, p. 7).   
A weapon system’s life-cycle costs include the costs for research and 
development, procurement, sustainment, and disposal.  Weapon systems are costly 
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requiring expensive spare parts and logistics support to meet readiness levels.  
Several examples of soaring life-cycle costs for weapon systems include the 
following:  
 Life-cycle O&S costs for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—the newest 
aircraft being acquired for the Air Force, Navy, and Marines—are now 
estimated at about $916 billion, and its operating costs per hour are 
expected to exceed the legacy aircraft that it is replacing (GAO, 2010, 
p. 1). 
 The Air Force’s updated life-cycle O&S cost estimate for the F-22A in 
2009 found a 47% increase in life-cycle O&S costs from the 2005 
estimate. In 2009, it was estimated that it would cost approximately 
$59 billion to operate and support the F-22A, $19 billion more than was 
estimated in 2005. Life-cycle O&S costs increased despite a 34% 
reduction in fleet size, from 277 aircraft projected in the 2005 estimate 
to 184 aircraft projected in the 2009 estimate (GAO, 2010, p. 5). 
Another example of discrepancies between projected and actual costs is the 
Navy’s F/A-18E/F.  Although the increase is not of the same magnitude as the F-22A 
example, direct comparisons between estimated and actual costs are more 
complicated because of program changes. In 2005, it was estimated that the Navy 
would have 428 aircraft in FY2009; the actual number was 16% less, at 358 aircraft. 
The Navy also estimated that the aircraft fleet as a whole would fly 780,628 hours 
from FY1999 through FY2009; actual hours flown was 20% less, at 625,067 hours 
(GAO, 2010, p. 26).  On a per-flight-hour basis, the FY2009 O&S costs were 
$15,346, 40% higher than the $10,979 forecast in 1999. Although total actual costs 
were less than estimated for the 11-year period, actual annual costs for FY2005 
through FY2009 have exceeded the annual estimates by an average of 10% after 
accounting for inflation (GAO, 2010, p. 26).  Figures 10 and 11 show actual costs 
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Figure 10. Comparison of Estimated and Actual O&S Costs for the  
Navy’s F/A-18E/F (FY1999–FY2009) 
(GAO, 2010, p. 27) 
Note. The information presented in this figure is subject to limitations in the data contained in the 
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Figure 11. Comparison of Navy F/A-18E/F Total Estimated and Actual  
O&S Costs, FY1999–FY2009 
(GAO, 2010, p. 60) 
Note.  
(a) The percentages for the cost sub-elements listed under the unit-level operations cost element and the 
sustaining support cost element are shown separately and are also rolled up into the overall percentages 
for these two cost elements. 
(b) Since these costs were not included in the production milestone estimate, a percentage increase or 
decrease could not be calculated. 
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V. Open Architecture  
The Navy has been transforming traditional business practices through Naval 
Open Architecture (NOA).  NOA, a multi-faceted, enterprise-wide business model 
and product line strategy, leverages “open” computer design principles and 
architectures.  It expands on the OA model and taps into a multiple developer 
network to deliver cost-effective, innovative, and rapid/spiral acquisition capabilities. 
Billions of dollars in acquisition expenditures, along with subsequent life-cycle costs, 
are at stake with the migration to an OA business model.  OA could dramatically 
improve maintenance processes and substantially reduce costs over the 20-, 30-, 
and 50-year life cycle of Navy ships. 
OA goals and practices are identified in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Business, Technical, and Cultural Changes From OA 
(Guertin, 2009, p. 2) 
OA and open-business models propel the Navy into the next era of joint 
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 Lower life-cycle costs for IWS systems. Total cost of ownership 
decreases due to increased maintainability, interoperability, 
upgradeability, and use of a wider variety of vendors. 
 Better performing systems. Ability to rapidly upgrade hardware and 
software with the latest technology enables greater capabilities, 
efficiencies, and interoperability to enable reengineered warfighting 
processes. 
 Improved interoperability for joint warfighting. Software reuse and 
modularity facilitates interoperability between systems that use an 
open architecture framework. 
 Facilitating competition and increasing cooperation between 
commercial and military electronics industries. Moving away from 
proprietary systems enables a broader range of ideas and 
technological solutions.   
NOA is described as follows:  
the confluence of business and technical practices yielding modular, 
interoperable systems that adhere to open standards and published 
interfaces. This approach significantly increases opportunities for innovation 
and competition, enables reuse of components, facilitates rapid technology 
insertion, and reduces maintenance constraints. (Naval Open Architecture 
Enterprise Team, 2008)   
A set of principles guide NOA: 
 encouraging competition and collaboration through alternative solutions 
and sources;  
 building modular designs and disclosing data to permit evolutionary 
designs, technology insertion, competitive innovation, and alternative 
competitive approaches from multiple qualified sources; 
 building interoperable joint warfighting applications and ensuring secure 
information exchange using common services (e.g., common time 
reference), common warfighting applications (e.g., track manager), and 
information assurance as intrinsic design elements; 
 identifying or developing reusable application software selected through 
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matter expert peers and based on data-driven analysis and 
experimentation to meet operational requirements; and 
 ensuring life-cycle affordability including system design, development, 
delivery, and support while mitigating COTS obsolescence by exploiting 
the Rapid Capability Insertion Process/Advanced Processor Build 
methodology (Naval Open Architecture Enterprise Team, 2008). 
Implementing OA requires the commitment and participation of all 
stakeholders across the naval enterprise OA, as seen in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Naval Enterprise OA Stakeholders 
(Guertin, 2009, p. 4) 
A. Open Systems Architecture 
NOA has evolved into open systems architecture (OSA).  OSA, which is 
designed to develop and drive adoption of enterprise-level business and technical 
open-system approaches, is also anticipated to rapidly field new capabilities, lower 
total-ownership costs, reduce cycle-times, and enhance interoperability and access 
to innovation. 
OSA also relies on open architecture and an open business model, requiring 
the DoN to leverage collaborative innovation among the numerous participants 
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TOC.  OSA attributes include design disclosure, published interfaces, open 
technology standards and tools, COTS hardware, design reuse, data rights, and 
open infrastructure.  Several principles guide OSA: 
 using modular designs based on standards and allowing for 
independent acquisition of system components; 
 encouraging competition and collaboration through development of 
alternative solutions and sources; 
 using components providing best return on investment (ROI; and 
 implementing enterprise investment strategies that maximize reuse of 
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VI. Maintenance Free Operating Period 
For more than a decade, the concept of the Maintenance Free Operating 
Period (MFOP) has been analyzed, implemented, and debated. In general, MFOP is 
defined as 
The period of operation during which an item will be able to carry out all its 
assigned missions, without the operator being restricted in any way due to 
system faults or limitations, with the minimum of maintenance. (Kumar, 
Knezevic, & Crocker, 1999, pp. 127–131) 
It is a period with no required, emergency, or unexpected maintenance 
needed.  Following each MFOP is a maintenance recovery period (MRP) in which 
maintenance is done to ensure that the system is recovered to complete the next 
MFOP cycle. For our specific purposes, MFOP is defined as the specified period of 
time that a system must be available in support of its required mission, with a 
specified level of reliability with no open cabinet maintenance (Guertin & Bruhns, 
2011, p. 2).   
This section begins with a discussion of the MFOP’s evolution in the United 
Kingdom (UK), potential applications, critical components, and MFOP applications 
and implementations. 
A. Evolution of the MFOP 
Procurement and support of military equipment consumed around 40% of 
annual defense cash expenditure in 2009 in the UK (Gray, 2009, p. 6).  For more 
than three decades, there have been a number of reforms focused on logistics and 
acquisitions. Since the implementation of Smart Acquisition in 1998, the acquisition 
process has been continuously evolving with many reform programs aimed at 
process improvements, upgrading skills and driving efficiency. Figure 14 highlights 
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Figure 14. Select Key Reforms in the UK’s Ministry of Defense  
Acquisition System  
(Gray, 2009, p. 6) 
Smart Acquisition had seven key principles: 
 revising the project delivery front-end process to deliver robust 
requirements and increase value for money over the whole life of 
equipment; 
 restructuring the organization around integrated project teams; 
 reducing delays while introducing streamlined approvals and oversight 
mechanisms to deliver improved scrutiny; 
 implementing powerful contractor incentives to reward co-operation in 
capturing savings and penalties to punish non-cooperation; 
 simplifying procurement processes for smaller projects; 
 clarifying accountabilities, roles, and organizational structures across 
the acquisition community; and 
 restructuring in-service support (Gray, 2009, p. 59). 
In 1998, a strategic defense review was conducted in the UK which identified 
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scarce resources, drugs, or crime, and not from direct military threats in the UK or 
Western Europe.  With the post–Cold War environment and those most likely 
sources of conflict, the 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review called for a more flexible, 
mobile, responsive fighting force and made a number of key recommendations: 
 enhance joint capabilities: a strategy for increased cooperation 
between forces and rapid response; 
 plug the gap: enhanced capability of defense medical services and 
remedies for weaknesses in logistics; 
 modernize the services: commitment to defense hardware through to 
2015;  
 make the world a safer place: deterring and preventing conflict and 
crisis; and 
 make every penny count: introduction of Smart Procurement, the joint 
Defence Storage and Distribution Agency (Gray, 2009, p. 66). 
After the strategic defense review, changes had to be made in defense, 
particularly given the following factors: 
 continued reductions in defense spending would occur; 
 fewer personnel and less equipment would be deployed on 
maintenance and support; 
 a quality product, with better availability and better mission reliability, 
would be required;  
 increased flexibility and more deployments would become the norm; 
and 
 future deployments would be to bare bases, necessitating the 
requirement for a minimal logistics footprint (Hockley, 2006, p. 23-1).   
With this background, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted 
a customer needs analysis and concluded the following: 
 Guaranteed periods of availability were required. With a much 
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overstretched.  Fewer resources could be used more efficiently with 
periods of availability guaranteed. 
 Mission effectiveness was paramount. Planning certainty would 
allow minimum resources to be organized to support the task and 
would result in giving the desired minimum logistics footprint for a 
sustained deployment (Hockley, 2006, p. 23-2).   
To achieve the goal of guaranteed aircraft availability periods, fundamental 
changes in design and maintenance philosophy would be required.  Regarding the 
design issue, mean time between failure (MTBF) had been the primary metric of 
reliability in acquisition contracts, and it is based on the assumption that failures will 
occur.  The reliability specification for the Tornado GR1, for example, is an MTBF of 
1.25 hours, which translates into 800 faults per 1,000 flying hours (Hockley, 2006, p. 
23-2).  However, the MTBF reliability metric was not consistent with the RAF’s need 
for guaranteed periods of aircraft availability, and the metric failed to “engineer-in” 
the right solution (Hockley, 2006, p. 23-3). 
By defining the needs of its customers, a paradigm shift and the concept of 
the MFOP emerged. The MFOP was an attempt to define mission and basic 
reliability requirements, giving operators guaranteed periods of availability with a 
minimal support logistics footprint (Hockley, 2006, p. 23-2).   
B. The MFOP Metric 
The MFOP is a reliability measure.  There are four broad types of reliability 
measures, often used by customers and manufacturers to quantify system 
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Figure 15. Categories of Reliability Measures 
(Kumar, 2012, p. 50) 
Basic reliability measures are used to predict the system’s ability to operate 
without maintenance and logistics support.  Measures such as reliability function and 
failure function fall under this category.  Mission reliability measures are used to 
predict the system’s ability to complete a mission.  Measures in this category include 
mission reliability, MFOP, hazard function, and failure-free operating period (FFOP). 
Operational reliability measures are used to predict a system’s performance in a 
planned environment (e.g., design, quality, maintenance, environment, support 
policy).  This category includes measures such as the MFOP, mean time between 
critical failure (MTBCF), mean time between maintenance (MTBM), and mean time 
between overhaul (MTBO).  Contractual reliability measures are used to define, 
measure, and evaluate a manufacturer’s program.  This category includes measures 
such as MTBF and mean time to failure (MTTF; Kumar, 2012, pp. 50–60).  Table 3 
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Table 3. Reliability Measures 
(Adapted from Kumar, 2012, pp. 50–60) 




 Predicts system’s ability to 
operate without 







 Predicts system’s ability to 
complete a mission  
 Considers only those 
failures causing mission 
failure 
 Maintenance free operating period 
(MFOP) 
 Failure free operating period (FFOP)  
 Mission reliability 





 Predicts system 
performance operating in a 
planned environment  
 Mean time between maintenance 
(MTBM) 
 Mean time between overhaul (MTBO) 
 Maintenance free operating period 
(MFOP) 
 Mean time between critical failure 
(MTBCF)  
 Mean time between unscheduled 
removal (MTBUR)  
Contractual 
Reliability  
 Defines, measures, and 
evaluates manufacturer’s 
program 
 Considers design and 
manufacturing 
characteristics 
 Essentially the inherent 
reliability characteristic 
 Mean time between failure (MTBF) 
 Mean time to failure (MTTF) 
 
C. Applications of the MFOP 
The MFOP can be applied in several areas, including maintenance, 
technology refresh, technology insertion, and design. 
 Maintenance. There are generally three types of maintenance: 
corrective, preventative, and prognostic. Corrective maintenance, or 
the “fix on failure” maintenance, is the system/part replacement when 
the system or part replacement fails. Preventative maintenance is 
scheduled in advance to prevent system/part failure and is typically 
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relies on a system sensor indicating impending system failure (total or 
part).  
In addition, a system, or each part composing the system, often has 
multiple maintenance levels with various degrees of difficulty. For 
example, a computer server in a sonar system may have several 
maintenance levels. The first level is basic repairs while the second 
intermediate level requires more difficult repairs and the third level 
requires very difficult repairs that may only be performed at the original 
manufacturer’s premises. 
The MFOP provides an optimal maintenance plan because it defers 
corrective maintenance to the MRP, so the “unscheduled” element of 
maintenance is exchanged for more scheduled maintenance planning. 
Contingency resources could be re-allocated to scheduled work, and 
logistics support could be concentrated in one particular location of 
aircraft operations (Wu, Liu, Ding, & Liu, 2004, p. 17).  
 Technology refresh. The replacement of earlier-generation parts with 
later generations because the earlier-generation parts are or are soon 
to be obsolete. After the refresh, the functional capacity of the system 
is typically the same as or greater than the functional capacity of the 
system before refresh.  
 Technology insertion. The replacement of one or more earlier-
generation parts of a system with parts of a later generation to 
increase the functional capacity of the system and/or to migrate to a 
different technology. Technology insertion is optional and typically done 
to upgrade system capabilities or migrate to newer technology. 
 Design. The MFOP concept could be adapted as a performance 
requirement, perhaps a measure of effectiveness, in contracts. To 
achieve a specified aircraft MFOP, for example, all components would 
have to be designed and maintained to have an MFOP greater than 
the specification.  
Key to design is the consideration of failure life characteristics. The 
issue here is whether the designer can successfully address this issue 
to provide a sufficient amount of warning between the end of an MFOP 
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Figure 16. Failure Life Characteristics 
(Hockley, 2006, p. 23-6) 
D. Areas Critical to the MFOP  
There are a number of enabling ideas and technologies contributing to the 
MFOP, as summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Enabling Ideas and Technologies 
(Mitchell, 1999, p. 14-3) 
AREA COMMENTS 
Condition Monitoring  Measurement and interpretation of data, condition 
indication, determination of maintenance requirement. 
Redundant Systems  To achieve fault tolerance, using either hardware, software 
or data duplication in various forms. Can achieve significant 
reliability gains but at cost of potential increased 
complexity, weight, volume and power consumption. 
Reconfigurable Systems  Recovery, automatic or otherwise, of a system after a 
failure without the need for the system to go off-line.  
Prognostics  The capability to detect early warning of impending failure, 
enabling pre-emptive maintenance action to be carried out 
or to trigger re-configuration or redundancy processes. 
Diagnostics  To enable timely, accurate failure diagnostics to support 
minimum repair times during the maintenance recovery 
period. 
 Location and isolation of a particular failed component or 
system enables reconfiguration of systems or mission 
objectives. 
Reversionary Modes  Allowing software to back up when a failure occurs and 
take a different path, thus bypassing failure causes. 
N-version Programming  A software form of redundancy, involving voting between 
differently, often independently, developed software units. 
Recovery Blocks and Self Healing  Backwards error recovery carried out by periodically saving 
the system state and reverting to it when necessary. 
Exception Handling  Giving the software the ability to deal actively with failures, 
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In addition, system reliability is a critical factor in the probability of completing 
an MFOP.  System reliability normally diminishes as the equipment is used during its 
operating period, and an MFOP can be determined by plotting the reliability from 
time zero and overlaying the required probability of completion, as seen in Figure 17 
(Hockley, 2006, p. 23-7). 
 
 
Figure 17. Reliability vs. Time and Probability of M-FOP Completion 
(Hockley, 2006, p. 23-7) 
E. Potential Benefits 
When the MFOP concept was introduced, several benefits were cited.  First, 
operational effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if a weapon system would only 
require specific maintenance levels at a pre-determined period.  In addition, logistics 
support and repair costs could be minimized with maintenance downtime pre-
programmed around operational commitments.  According to RAF Squadron Leader 
Mitchell, other potential benefits included the following: 
 Reliability of contracts would improve because the MFOP is a simpler 
concept than MTBF. 
 There would be a greater understanding of failure mechanisms and 
subsequent development of necessary design tools.  
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 True causes of failure would be identified because of the physics 
approach, rather than statistical analysis involving MTBF. 
 The assumption of a constant failure rate would be challenged 
because system predictions would be built-up from the sum of the 
individual component failure distributions, rather than as a population, 
giving a more realistic bottom-up rather than top-down approach. 
 Using the principle of a failure-free period rather than failures randomly 
occurring would alter the basis of logistics planning. Compared with 
using reliability predictions based on constant failure models, more 
realistic spares provisioning should be possible, and expensive, 
inconvenient unscheduled maintenance should be minimized. 
 The approach would deliver a simple and more confident prediction of 
fleet costs and lease pricing details (Mitchell, 1999, p. 14-6). 
F. Potential Risks 
Alternatively, potential risks were also acknowledged by Mitchell (1999). In 
migrating from MTBF to the MFOP, inspection or refurbishment requirements for 
some parts may be increased while other components may be scrapped before the 
end of their previously used life. As a result, each component, line replaceable unit 
(LRU), and system would require some design analysis to establish its optimum 
MFOP and associated cost (Mitchell, 1999, p. 14-7). Under this scenario, modeling 
to determine potential manpower savings was difficult. Other risks included the 
following: 
 Increased acquisition costs from a more rigorous design process. The 
trade-off between investment in design/manufacture for M/F-FOP and 
the cost/operational consequences of poor equipment reliability would 
have to be further understood. 
 Extensive analysis, conducted by skilled technicians, would have to be 
done because a large number of individual LRUs, subsystems, and 
system MFOPs into an overall weapon system MFOP would have to 
be aggregated and understood completely.  
 An integrated knowledge of engineering process design, an 
appreciation of practical in-use problems, and an understanding of 
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 Partnership between subcontractors, suppliers, prime contractors, and 
customers will be essential to derive full benefits (Mitchell, 1999, p. 14-
8). 
G. Examples of the MFOP  
Since the MFOP’s introduction, there are several examples of how the 
concept has been used and investigated. The Ultra Reliable Aircraft (URA) project 
and the A400M program are two examples of the application of MFOP principles and 
techniques. 
3. The Ultra Reliable Aircraft Project  
The URA was a research project in the late 1990s focused on aircraft 
operational availability and reliability–involved MFOP concepts.  At the time, 
consequences of unscheduled delays typically exceeded £1 million per aircraft per 
year in the private sector while the costs to the UK’s Ministry of Defence was £1 
billion per year for its entire fleet (Bottomley, 1999, p. 1). The URA was a private-
/public–sector consortium comprising customers and platform/major systems with 
members that included British Aerospace Airbus and Military Aircraft and 
Aerostructures; GKN Westland Helicopters Limited; GEC Avionics; GEC Aerospace; 
GEC Marconi Electronic Systems; Lucas Aerospace; Messier Dowty Limited; Dowty 
Aerospace; Normalair Garrett; Rolls Royce Military and Civil; BMT Reliability 
Consultants; The Royal Air Force; The Defence Evaluation and Research Agency; 
and Warwick Manufacturing Group (University of Warwick; Bottomley, 1999, p. 2).  
The companies each contributed £0.5 million for a one-year study. 
The project was broken down into a series of phases and work packages. 
First, a pilot study was done while the main project phase started April 1997.  One of 
the work packages sought to identify the feasibility of achieving the complete 
removal of unscheduled maintenance and the provision of “guaranteed” MFOPs 
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4. MFOP Examples: The A400M Program 
MFOP was applied to the A400M program. The A400M program, a 
cooperative between seven European nations, is managed by the Joint Organization 
for Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) for the acquisition of a military transport 
aircraft system from Airbus Military.  Using a commercial approach, the goal was to 
produce and deliver an aircraft at fixed prices with a single-phase contract (including 
development, production, and initial support at minimum life-cycle costs; Heuninckx, 
2006, p. 10-3). 
Deployment reliability is a key requirement of the A400M and is defined as 
the probability that one aircraft will complete a planned deployment period, using 
only spare parts contained in a transportable deployment kit if operated and 
maintained according to standard conditions. The A400M’s deployment reliability 
was guaranteed as 90% for a deployment of 15 days. Although Airbus Military’s 
objective was to provide users with an MFOP of 15 days, it was determined that it 
could not achieve a 15-day MFOP with 90% certainty. In this case, MFOP was 
defined as a “period of operation during which an aircraft is able to carry out its 
assigned missions without the need for any maintenance except pre-defined flight 
servicing (e.g. generic visual inspection, replenishment) and role change activities” 
(Heuninckx, 2006, p. 10-11). 
H. MFOP Applicability to the DoD and DoN 
The MFOP concept, in conjunction with technology enablers, is a proactive 
policy from the traditional reactive fix-on-failure one. It eliminates the need for 
corrective maintenance over a specific time frame, including overseas deployment 
periods or even technology refresh intervals.  With its potential for substantial cost 
savings and improved performance, several pilot programs were conducted using 
MFOP concepts to determine whether the concept is a practical support alternative 
for deployed Navy ships.  The next section discusses the Submarine MFOP Pilot 
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VII. Department of Navy MFOP Demonstrations 
With its potential for substantial cost savings and improved performance, pilot 
programs were conducted using MFOP concepts to determine whether the concept 
is a practical support alternative for deployed Navy ships.  MFOP-enabled systems 
provide better, cheaper, and faster products because MFOP designs 
 increased operational availability to the warfighter;  
 are cheaper—with less material, infrastructure, and training to provide 
and manage by eliminating platform/system-level material support 
packages; and  
 are faster to deploy with distance support techniques, eliminating 
delays in supporting fielded products, and are available worldwide 
(Guertin & Bruhns, 2011).   
In this section, we discuss those projects further.  We begin with a general 
discussion of the MFOP and its implications for the DoN, then review the pilots and 
address some of the lessons learned. 
A. MFOP Applicability to the DoN 
MFOP is defined as a period of operation during which an aircraft is able to 
carry out its assigned missions without the need for any maintenance except pre-
defined flight servicing (e.g., generic visual inspection, replenishment) and role 
change activities. During an MFOP, faults may occur in the aircraft but they must not 
require corrective maintenance action until the aircraft returns to the base. Once the 
MFOP is complete, an aircraft may have to be restored to its fully serviceable state 
at a suitable location (maintenance recovery period).  
For the DoN, an MFOP may be an opportunity to leverage OSA and the use 
of COTS technologies. For example, an MFOP eliminates maintenance and the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 40 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
technology refresh and insertion for improved operational availability, as shown in 
Figure 18 (Margolis, 2005, p. 9). 
 
Figure 18. MFOP Wedge of Opportunity 
(Margolis, 2005, p. 9) 
An MFOP is also an opportunity to transform traditional ILS practices at the 
system, platform, and shore support levels, as seen in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. Shipboard ILS Is Eliminated in Favor of “Better–Cheaper–Faster” Distance 
Support 
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In particular, an MFOP could 
 Reduce system maintenance costs. The cost of maintaining complex 
systems is high.  A preventive, scheduled maintenance strategy such 
as the MFOP, where maintenance is performed only when the system 
needs maintenance, results in longer maintenance-free intervals and 
decreased downtime costs over time. 
In FY2011, total ship maintenance amounted to $8.5 billion. The 
leading driver of depot maintenance demand for the Navy (and the Air 
Force) is ownership of ships and aircraft, which generally operate at 
the same rates from year to year, according to an analysis conducted 
by the firm LMI in 2011.2  In FY2009, the Navy’s average depot 
maintenance cost was $2.9 million per destroyer and $5.2 million per 
cruiser.3  
Reduce spare parts inventory and costs/optimized spare parts 
management. The MFOP could improve inventory management and 
assist in eliminating unnecessary spare parts.  It could impact how 
many spare parts would be needed and where they would be stored.  A 
GAO analysis found that the average annual value of the inventory for 
FY2004 to FY2007 was about $13.7 billion. Of this total, about $7.1 
billion (52%) was beyond the amount needed to meet the requirements 
objective and about $5.1 billion (37%) was not needed to meet the 
current requirements objective plus an additional two years of 
estimated future demand (GAO, 2010, p. 5).  The DoD’s total value of 
secondary inventory, including spare parts and other items, was about 
$94 billion in September 2008.4  
In a cost-efficiency analysis of the Navy’s spare parts inventory, the 
GAO found that for FY2004 to FY2007, the Navy had significantly 
more inventory than was needed to support current requirements. 
During that time frame, the annual average of $18.7 billion of Navy 
secondary inventory exceeded requirements by approximately $7.5 
                                            
2 The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directed the 
Department of Defense to contract an independent study on the effectiveness and efficiency of DoD 
organic maintenance depots providing the logistics capabilities and capacities necessary for national 
defense. 
3 Based on data submitted to the Navy to the Depot Maintenance Cost System and averaged across 
the fleet. 
4 The DoD defines secondary inventory items to include reparable components, subsystems, and 
assemblies other than major end items (e.g., ships, aircraft, and helicopters), consumable repair 
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billion (GAO, 2008, p. 3). About half of the $7.5 billion of inventory 
exceeding current requirements was retained to meet anticipated 
future demands, and the remainder was retained for other reasons or 
identified as potential excess. Based on Navy demand forecasts, 
inventory that exceeded current requirements was sufficient to satisfy 
several years, or even decades, of anticipated supply needs.  
Moreover, a large proportion of items that exceeded current 
requirements had no projected demand.  
 Improve operations through higher availability. With an MFOP, 
higher availability of systems could be achieved with improved 
operations.  It could assist in ensuring that Navy forces are ready to 
surge forward on short notice, complementing other initiatives. 
At the time of the September 11 attacks and in preparation for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, a GAO report found that only a small number 
of ships at peak readiness were deployed because most of the Navy’s 
ships were unavailable (GAO, 2004, p. 1).   
Several pilot programs were conducted using an MFOP to determine whether 
the concept is a viable option for deployed Navy ships, with its cost- and efficiency-
savings potential. 
B. DoN MFOP Pilots 
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Table 5. MFOP Pilot/Demonstration 
(Guertin, 2010, p. 7; Ondish, 2006, p. 15) 
 Submarine MFOP Pilot 
(2005) 





• 90-day MFOP conducted on 
4 ships 
• Spare processors were 
embedded 
• Manual failover procedures 
conducted by ship’s force 
• Remote reporting of system 
data logs not implemented 
 
• 180-day MFOP conducted 
on LHD-7 
• All IT-related spares 
embedded in test system 
• Auto failover accomplished in 
software 
• Remote reporting of system 
data logs over a secure 
internet protocol router 
network (SIPRNet) 
• Remote system log-in for 
system sustainment and 
maintenance at sea 
 
 
Post Pilot and 
Demonstration 
Lessons  
• Even limited MFOP 
boundary size can provide 
exponential gains to the 
logistics and maintenance 
business processes and 
organizational 
infrastructure. 
• Distance support processes 
from Customer Support 
Center produced cost 
saving to Fleet Technical 
Assistance dollars by a ratio 
of 7:1. 
• Substituted software 
reconfiguration/recovery (2 
min. pilot demonstrated) for 
classic MTTR (20 min. for 
ARCI) to generate a ratio of 
10:1. 
• Vendor mean time between 
failure (MTBF) data may 
vary significantly from actual 
MTBF data.
• Distance support 15:1 cost 
savings 
 
The Acoustic Rapid COTS insertion (ARCI) MFOP Pilot Program first tested 
feasibility of COTS technology to achieve a maintenance-free operating environment 
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30, 2005. The principal objective of this pilot program was to install hardware, 
software, and COTS-based logistics capability into AN/BQQ-10 systems on selected 
submarines to demonstrate the ability to achieve a 90-day period of MFOP at a 
confidence at or above 95% (Rosenberger, Altizer, Ondish, & Steed, 2005, p. 3).  
Four U.S. Navy 688 class submarines participated in the MFOP Pilot Program, and 
each of the platforms entered into the pilot program after their TI02/APB03, 
AN/BQQ-I0 system was installed.5  The submarines were augmented with additional 
embedded servers and additional design elements to ensure a 90-day MFOP period 
for tactical software availability within the MFOP boundary while the rest of the 
system was managed using a traditional ILS support system.  
A subsequent demonstration five years later tested a range of technical 
challenges encountered during the earlier attempt.  The 2010 Surface Ship 
demonstration aboard the USS Iwo Jima further explored the MFOP concept further, 
along with potential cost savings. The MFOP was doubled to 180 days, and the 
certified maintenance support package provided in the temporary installation 
(TEMPALT) included zero support items to the ship during this pilot.  The following 
section provides an overview of both projects. 
C. ARCI MFOP Pilot (2004–2005) 
In March 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was established 
between the Navy Commercial Technology Transition Office (CTTO), the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), and the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).  The 
MOA noted that with the increasing usage of COTS technology and to fully capitalize 
on benefits, DoN acquisition programs must develop effective sustainability 
                                            
5 The ARCI program operated on a two-year cycle that created new hardware architecture using 
COTS technology and products. These series of hardware baselines are referred to as a technology 
insertion (TI). To date, a hardware baseline has been deployed in the submarine fleet for technology 
insertion in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 (TI98, TI00, T102, and TI04). ARCI also uses a software 
update cycle which creates a new software baseline with additional functional capability each year. 
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strategies. In particular, “Support requirements for military systems generally exceed 
25 to 30 years, in contrast to the 4 to 7 year support cycles expected for commercial 
technical capital systems. Additionally, the military percentage of total commercial 
demand has dropped sharply. Thus, DoN does not receive the level of support 
customary in previous decades. The combination of extended support periods and 
diminished life cycle support makes military systems vulnerable to a host of 
supportability problems” (Rosenberger et al., 2005, p. 20).  The MFOP was 
envisioned to derive several benefits, including dramatically reducing on-board 
repair part requirements, diminishing crew maintenance and training demands, 
reducing TOC, and potentially improving a sailor’s quality of life. 
The MOA defined the goals and expectations for demonstrating a COTS 
sustainability strategy that would eliminate unplanned system maintenance during a 
90-day submarine operating period. Specific objectives in the MOA included the 
following: 
 perform required engineering analysis to achieve improved reliability 
through redundancy concurrent with the installation of ARCI; 
 develop hardware independent fault location, isolation, and fail-over 
software allowing automatic reconfiguration using hot spares within the 
ARCI system; 
 develop an improved interactive electronic technical manual (IETM) 
focusing on software maintenance rather than hardware 
troubleshooting and repair/replacement procedures; 
 provide updated IETM with reconfiguration instructions to make use of 
hot spares; 
 develop data screening/mining software that automatically identify 
required maintenance actions and sparing requirements from available 
fault log information; 
 develop automated message formatting of required maintenance 
actions and sparing requirements for subsequent off-board delivery to 
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 update previously conducted surveys of commercially available 
technologies necessary to achieve high availability MFOP status 
(including storage area networks, system availability, operational 
availability, root cause analysis, system management, infrastructure 
resource management, network management, trouble ticket, remote 
support, software management, communications middleware, virtual 
command centers, and integrated databases; Rosenberger et al., 
2005, p. 5). 
At the time of the demonstration, U.S. Submarine Combat Systems installed 
on the Los Angeles class (688 and 6881), Seawolf class, and new construction 
Virginia class fast attack platforms used COTS technology and products. The ARCI 
program capitalized on cutting-edge technology given that rapid changes in 
technology result in forced obsolescence when commercial firms stop providing 
support for hardware. Forced obsolescence impacts a wide range of areas, including 
operations, maintenance modernization, repairs, spares, personnel, and training.  
With the proliferation of ARCI installations, it was recognized that the 
traditional ILS structure and system support process could not manage the rapid 
pace required to make the many ILS product changes needed to support the 
hardware/software modifications that the ever-evolving ARCI systems were 
experiencing (Rosenberger et al., 2005, p. 2).  As a consequence, there was a 
proposal to develop a system architecture incorporating the MFOP concept. The 
MFOP used technology to reduce/eliminate most existing on-board maintenance 
functions, generating shipboard operator actions, material, training, and 
documentation cost during a submarine’s defined deployment operating period 
(Rosenberger et al., 2005, p. 5).  Automatic fail-over/error recovery routines, with 
redundant hardware/software architecture, allowed the system to operate at full 
functionality—without the usual reactive fix-on-failure maintenance/repair.  The 
concept of MFOP enabled required hardware maintenance/repair/replacement to be 
done on a pre-planned, non-deployment period or during the next technology refresh 
or insertion period. 
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 Select the best of breed by conducting lab tests with available real-
world data. 
 Conduct at-sea validation tests as part of the APB process on a not-to-
interfere basis. 
 Incorporate into curriculum and conduct commercially available training 
courses focused on software maintenance, and not hardware 
troubleshooting and repair/replacement procedures. 
 Install additional hardware on selected submarines to begin migration 
towards a 90- day MFOP with 95% reliability. 
 Install hardware independent fault localization, isolation, and fail-over 
software allowing for automatic reconfiguration using hot spares within 
the ARCI system in conjunction with APB 03 (Rosenberger et al., 2005, 
p. 10). 
Figure 20 shows how the MFOP was anticipated to impact sea maintenance 
management. 
 
Figure 20. At-Sea Maintenance Management 
(Ondish, 2006, p. 5) 
1. Maintenance Issues 
Maintenance requirements for each unique ARCI TI/APB are different and 
complicated. For example, the control and sensor data networks used in ARCI have 
evolved from an Ethernet/Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) in TI98 to an 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)/Fiber Channel Standard (FCS) in TI00 to 
Gigabit Ethernet (GIGE)/FCS in TI02 to GIGE/GIGE in TI04 (Rosenberger, 2005, p. 
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performance prediction and lineup, data recording, and ship monitoring), along with 
advanced techniques and algorithms for detection, track, and classification 
functions.  The responsibility of maintaining logistics products such as system 
maintenance training and troubleshooting technical documentation included in the 
IETM became extremely challenging.  
One solution to updating maintenance-related logistics products with each 
TI/APB was to architect a period of deferred maintenance to planned, in-port 
periods. During this planned period, maintenance would be done by intermediate-
level maintainers and not operational-level boat sailors.  
2. MFOP Pilot Phases 
The MFOP Pilot Program was divided into several phases. During the 
engineering phase, the following steps were taken to ensure that the MFOP could be 
achieved: 
 The system architecture was reviewed. This was done to identify which 
portions were maintenance free. The number of processing resources 
required to execute full system functionality and construct a model of 
the candidate maintenance-free boundary were determined (see 
Figure 21). 
 The best available MTBF was used.  MTBF data was used to 
determine, via simulation, the number of embedded spares required to 
achieve a high confidence (normally > 95%) of maintaining sufficient 
processing resources to execute full functionality for the entire MFOP.  
 The system footprint and budget were reviewed. This review was 
conducted to ensure that both the system footprint and budget were 
sufficient to embed the additional resources required for the MFOP.  
 The system software management scheme was implemented. This 
was done to allow processing to be relocated from one resource to 
another, allowing for system reconfiguration in the event of a failure to 
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Figure 21. ARCI Processing Block Diagram 
(Rosenberger, 2005, p. 5) 
During the deployment/execution phase, a MFOP support team was 
established that consisted of Lockheed Martin and Navy Regional Maintenance 
Center development, integration, test, installation, and maintenance engineers. This 
team was responsible for any required maintenance within the MFOP boundary.  A 
customer support center (CSC) was also created as a single point of contact for 
servicing of ARCI maintenance requests.   
A critical aspect of this MFOP pilot was the use of an off-hull server that 
downloaded system maintenance data—data that was subsequently used by shore-
based technicians to assess system performance. These shore-based technicians 
could troubleshoot and maintain faulty systems as part of the Fleet Technical 
Assistance (FTA) process.  The Remote Off-Hull Maintenance Support (ROHMS), 
the web services component, enabled authorized personnel at an off-hull 
maintenance location to execute predefined queries for system maintenance–related 
data, retrieve that data through a SIPRNet connection, and provide feedback to the 
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Figure 22. Web Services 
(Ondish, 2006, p. 21) 
This capability enables shore-based technicians to conduct system 
assessments and troubleshoot problems reported via casualty reports (CASREP) or 
through any other means of requesting fleet technical assistance.  ROHMS 
demonstrated the potential of applying this capability to supporting the maintenance, 
manning, repair, and upgrade of the submarine fleet. Figure 23 shows ROHMS 
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Figure 23. ROHMS: Testing of MFOP Functionality Conducted  
in Norfolk 
(Ondish, 2006, p. 22) 
3. MFOP Pilot Program Results 
The MFOP Pilot Program far exceeded predictions and expectations. Of the 
four SSN 688 class platforms participating in the pilot program, no maintenance was 
required on the portion of the system designed to be maintenance free for the entire 
one-year period.  In addition, available embedded spares remained consistently high 
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Table 6. MFOP Pilot Program Final Results 












U dSSN 721 5-Sep-04 390 14 of 15 84 21.5%
SSN 710 3-Sep-04 392 12 of 12 185 47.1%
SSN 713 22-Nov-04 312 11 of 14 179 57.2%
SSN 705 8-Apr-05 175 14 of 14 110 62.5% 
4. Lessons Learned 
There were a number of valuable lessons learned and technological 
advances resulting from the pilot project.  For example, the number of embedded 
spares was revised to a more accurate figure based on historical data (Figure 24) 
from vendor-supplied data.  A model, initially developed to determine the number of 
embedded spares required to achieve a 90-day maintenance free operating period, 
was rerun.  In the rerun model, actual observed MTBF data obtained during the 
execution of the MFOP Pilot Program was used.  The MTBFs used in the updated 
analysis are based on over 20 million module operating hours and 82 failures.  
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Figure 24. Vendor and Actual MTFB Data 
(Ondish, 2006, p. 13) 
 
Figure 25. Predicted Reliability Based on ACTUAL MTBF Data 
(Rosenberger et al., 2005, p. 14) 
System maintenance data also proved very valuable when used by CSC staff 
to determine system health status and to provide efficient distance support.  The 
data provided several lessons regarding inefficiencies in current maintenance data 
collection and analysis processes. First, the time to create summary data reports 
sent to the ARCI CSC became excessive because the MFOP maintenance database 
grew over the logging period.  Secondly, the amount of operator intervention to 
create and send reports was not efficient.  Finally, the process of physically removing 
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replacement drives to be sent to the boats as dataset swing drives. This process for 
the complete data set retrieval process involved unnecessary hard drive movement 
and, more importantly, was very labor intensive.   
One unanticipated result of the ARCI pilot involved spare components that 
reduced the need for open cabinet repairs to sonar systems while on deployment 
(Boudreau, 2006, p. 34).  In a 2006 NPS study conducted by Michael Boudreau, 
Boudreau found that 
 sonar system spare components could be installed and fully powered 
in electronics cabinets, enabling them to be used in the event of a 
primary system malfunction;   
 if a system failure occurred in the operating system, it could be 
switched to a spare module without physical access to the cabinet;  
 the necessary quantities of plugged-in spares were calculated that 
would achieve a high likelihood of continued operation; and   
 open cabinet maintenance during deployment had been virtually  
eliminated (Boudreau, 2006, p. 34).  
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Table 7. Summary of ARCI Technological Advances Resulting From the  
MFOP Pilot 




• ARCI System Operational Availability improved by embedding 
spares within system.  
• In the case of a failure, software reconfiguration to utilize an 
embedded spare is approximately 2 minutes.  
• By contrast, the mean time to repair requirement is 20 minutes 
for a failed server. 
• A 10x improvement is achieved by having embedded MFOP 




• System Network Management tools were being included into the 
ARCI TI04 system based on this pilot and fleet lessons learned. 
Remote 
Support 
• Remote Support/Distance Support became critical part of MFOP 
Pilot and ARCI program.  
• Routine communication to the MFOP pilot platforms was 
established from the ARCI CSC.  
• Recommendations for keyboard recovery or placing an MFOP 
asset into a failed state were returned to the platform based on 
this analysis.  
• Additional non-MFOP related system problems were identified to 




• Prior to the MFOP Pilot Program, integrated databases were 
used for system management, target classification, and mission 
planning.  
• As part of the MFOP Pilot Program, a maintenance or MFOP 
database was added to the ARCI system.  
• Logging and analysis of critical system parameters was used in 
lab testing to assist in determining system problems and 
severity.  
• This data was used by MFOP Support Team personnel to 
expedite maintenance actions.  
• Analysis tools were being developed to better translate the 
maintenance data into maintenance support information as a 
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5. Summary 
The MFOP Pilot Program was conducted for a period of one year to test the 
feasibility of today’s COTS technology and the support tools it provides to design 
into the ARCI system architecture the ability to obtain a maintenance-free operating 
environment for a 90-day period. The results of the MFOP Pilot Program far 
exceeded predictions and expectations. A viable maintenance strategy, MFOP could 
potentially eliminate unplanned maintenance, along with its associated training, 
documentation, and supply support during the platform operating period. Figure 26 is 
a sample data analysis report. 
 
Figure 26. MFOP Sample Data Analysis Report 
(Rosenberger et al., 2005, p. 20) 
D. Surface Ship MFOP Demonstration (2010) 
The surface ship OA/MFOP’s objective was to develop a scalable and 
extensible demonstration system providing more than 99% probability tactical 
capability for a combat ship with 180 days of no open cabinet maintenance and 
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Bruhns, 2011, p. 4).  A number of commercial companies worked alongside the DoN 
to complete this pilot, as seen in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27. Participants in Surface Ship Demonstration 
(Guertin, 2010, p. 2) 
 
The surface ship demonstration was designed to ensure that lessons learned 
could be used for large-scale, complex National Security Systems (NSS) programs. 
For this demonstration, three particular design features were used: remote 
connectivity, data capture/collection, and fault tolerance.  Figure 28 shows the 
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Figure 28. OA/MFOP Design Elements 
(Guertin & Bruhns, 2011, p. 5) 
1. Fault Tolerance 
To ensure that the hardware platform was fault tolerant, redundancy was 
added and embedded based on the hardware vendor’s supplied component MTBF 
data. An additional method for controlling spare resources (failover) was also added.  
The IBM Blade Center “T-Chassis” was selected given the inherent redundancy built 
into the product design. In addition, the number of power, cooling, network 
communications, processors, and other elements were scalable to meet the 
reliability demands of the operating period (Guertin & Bruhns, 2011, p. 3).  The 
application server magnetic hard drives were relocated to the IBM DS3400 to further 
improve MTBF. 
Beyond redundancy, the ratio of uptime to total mission time had to be 
analyzed to achieve full operational availability. In this case, uptime is defined as the 
availability of warfighting capability and not a function of hardware longevity.  While 
components can fail at any time, the probability for failure is higher when a 
component is new and declines to a low probability for the bulk of the hardware life 
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fail, so an automated failover and network reporting were critical to an MFOP-
enabled system.   
Alternatively, component failures also rise toward the projected in-service life 
of the product and are significantly influenced by environmental conditions (i.e., 
temperature and humidity).  Environmental monitoring to track system operating 
conditions, in conjunction with historical environmental data, was essential to an 
MFOP system.  After conducting a survey of commercially available data center 
management software solutions, the IBM Director management software product 
was selected because it not only met monitoring and failover requirements, but it 
also offered a unique feature called “open fabric manager.”  This feature not only 
managed all worldwide names and logical unit numbers for application servers, but it 
also automatically reconnected the application storage volume on the storage area 
network (SAN) to a spare processor and resumed processing.   
2. Data Capture/Collection 
All components were monitored and the data was continuously collected for 
online assessment and post-mission analyses.  Using a layered approach, the 
OA/MFOP demonstration captured data that included time series monitoring of 
critical performance and environmental parameters. This layered approach is a 
critical design element that ensured scalability to multiple warfighting platforms and 
domains.  
Crucial information was made available that allowed decision-makers to 
perform prognostic maintenance decisions.  If a failure had occurred, automatic 
reconfiguration also occurred and a report was generated.  The distance support 
specialist had information on the system’s state, remaining hardware availability, and 
the likelihood of future component failures that reflected life and environmental 
conditions. Based on this information, three decisions were possible: 
1. Near-term corrective action is necessary to sustain operational 
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2. No action is required and corrective action can wait until after the 
deployment is complete.  
3. No action is required until the next full technology insertion event. 
(Guertin & Bruhns, 2011, p. 7)  
More importantly, these decisions could be made throughout the system’s life 
span and were fully available throughout the operational command and support 
infrastructure.  This was not possible under previous processes without an 
OA/MFOP-enabled system.  
The specific solutions to handle monitoring requirements are found in Table 8. 
Table 8. Monitoring Requirements 
(Guertin & Bruhns, 2011, p. 8) 
Hardware Monitoring 
 All replaceable component devices in the OA/MFOP system were 
monitored.  
 Components within the Blade Center hardware boundary were 
monitored by the two (redundant) Advanced Management Modules 
(AMMs).   
 Those external to the blade center were attached to the Ethernet 
network, and their state data collected through SNMP and SMI-S traps.  
These data were then interfaced with the IBM Director management 
software for monitoring and event action purposes.   
 The captured data were stored in an Oracle database that could be 
queried by subject matter experts as well as life-cycle support planners, 
project managers, and Type Commanders.  This data served in off 
board analyses leading to proactive decision-making. 
Environmental Monitoring 
 The physical environment is key to determining cause and effect 
properties of deployed hardware.   
 Most hardware failures that occur outside the machine’s expected 
longevity envelope are caused by extreme temperature, humidity, dust, 
power surges, and vibration.  
 The OA/MFOP demonstration system included an NTI Inc. Enviromux 
16™ processor to collect and transmit this data to the management 
server.  
 This data was time tagged for correlation and trending purposes in 
support of off-board analyses. 
Application Server 
Monitoring 
 Several software agents provide various levels and degrees of 
application server monitoring.  Generally, they all log application uptime, 
and provide some level of basic resource monitoring, such as CPU load 
percentage, Memory percentage, I/O throughput levels, and storage 
system utilization.   
 The OA/MFOP system selected and used the IBM Director 
management software “Level II Managed Agent” product for all 
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3. Remote Connectivity   
The OA/MFOP system was connected to SIPRNet.  This link enabled the 
collection of reliability performance information for online assessment and allowed 
subject matter experts (SMEs) ashore to restore system operation in the event of a 
software failure.  Figure 29 shows the distance support component. 
 
Figure 29. The Surface Ship MFOP Demonstration System 
(Guertin, 2010, p. 8) 
Three technologies were used to perform remote monitoring and 
administration functions:  
 The IBM Director management console, which provided remote 
administration functionality; 
 ROHMS, which provided off-hull transport mechanisms to collect and 
transport OA/MFOP system data; and 
 Virtual Network Connection (VNC), which provided remote login 
capability as a root user to any selected server. 
To monitor the system, the OA/MFOP system re-used the ROHMS software 
developed by NAVSEA PMS 401 contract that is based on open source software.  
Concise reports, about the size of a typical e-mail record, were sent. Under normal 
conditions, system stakeholders (i.e., SMEs, program managers, and type 
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the system was functioning as designed, brief reports were sufficient (Guertin & 
Bruhns, 2011, p. 9).  The types of reports generated were the following:  
 a daily summary status report that listed the status of all hardware, 
environmental levels, application availability, and resource utilization;   
 an event report if a system event or hardware failure occurred, in which 
case, the ROHMS connector on the ship transmitted an event report 
that listed cause, effect, and restorative action; and   
 a detailed report that provided event detail to be used by SMEs to 
determine if follow-up action or planning was necessary.   
The OA/MFOP system used two remote system administration techniques 
over SIPRNet, as seen in Table 9. 
Table 9. Remote System Techniques  
(Guertin & Bruhns, 2011, p. 9) 
TYPE PURPOSE 
Web Browser • Menu driven login using HTTPS with Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) encryption.   
• Used because system was deployed as 
autonomous, with no ship’s force assistance.  
• This method is very network bandwidth efficient, 
but in most instances the utility provided does not 
necessarily require the services of an off board 
SME.   
Virtual Network 
Connection (VNC) 
• Technique allowed remote SME to login to a 
specific server/processor at the system 
administrator level.   
• VNC used frame buffer relay techniques to provide 
the SME with a remote interface to the target 
machine. From there, the system could be 
analyzed, restored, and updated.   
• Real VNC product used to positively control the 
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Figure 30 shows the daily message data set. 
 
Figure 30. System Daily Status Message Data Set 
(Bruhns, 2009, p. 19) 
4. OA/MFOP Demonstration Results 
The demonstration successfully met expectations.  In the area of measured 
operational availability, the Common Network Interface (CNI) operational software 
was 99.67% over the deployment period.  The remaining unreliability level (0.33%) 
was due to the two induced failures used to test the automatic failover response of 
the system. The operational availability of the ROHMS application server was 
measured at 100%, because ROHMS was not intentionally failed while deployed 
(Guertin & Bruhns, 2011, p. 11). 
In addition, there were no actual hardware failures during the deployment 
period.  The system was in continuous operation for two years with no physical 
failures noted.  Six distance support objectives were also successfully demonstrated.  
These objectives, designed to eliminate the need for shipboard ILS products and 
Fleet Technical Assistance “fly-away” time and cost, were the following: monitoring 
all hardware statuses; monitoring server operations and resources; collecting system 
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automatic failover and recovery using embedded spares; and performing remote IT, 
including restarts, pushing files, adding applications, and correcting code errors. 
E. Summary 
To date, two projects involving MFOP concepts have been conducted by the 
Navy.  Both projects exceeded expectations with a number of efficiency and cost 
savings.  The ARCI pilot resulted in distance support cost savings by a ratio of 7:1 
while the USS Iwo Jima demonstration achieved a savings ratio of 15:1. Although 
one of the original project goals was to estimate the relative cost savings and ROI 
advantages of the MFOP, further research needs to be conducted into costs and 
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VIII. MFOP Models 
There have been efforts to quantify and apply the MFOP with mathematical 
models and simulation software.  This section briefly discusses some of those efforts 
and in the appendix, we provide an example of a future MFOP model that was 
initially developed by NPS. 
A. Maintenance Free Operating Period Model 
In 1999, U. D. Kumar, J. Knezevic, and J. Crocker developed the first MFOP 
mathematical models (Kumar et al., 2009).  In their paper, Maintenance Free 
Operating Period—An Alternative Measure to MTBF and Failure Rate for Specifying 
Reliability?, the authors developed two mathematical models to predict MFOPs: 
 a prediction based on a mission reliability approach and 
 a prediction based on an alternating renewal approach (Nowakowski & 
Werbinka, 2009). 
Under the first example, consider a system with n components connected in a 
series. The probability that the system will survive the i-th cycle of the MFOP, given 
that it survives (i − 1) cycles, is 
                                        (1) 
 
Rk(tmf) is the reliability of the k-th component for (the first) tmf life units 
(Nowakowski & Werbinka, 2009).  This model is based on the following 
assumptions: 
 The system time to failure and repair follows arbitrary distributions. 
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In the second alternating renewal approach, the MFOPs is found during a 
stated period of T along with the maintenance recovery period. The probability that a 
system operates for at least tmf	life units before it fails during T hours of operation is 
                                (2) 
where f	(μ	|tmf	) is the probability that the system fails at time μ (Nowakowski & 
Werbinka, 2009).  This model is based on the following assumptions in a repairable 
system: 
 the time to failure distribution of an item follows arbitrary distribution 
with density function f(t), 
 the maintenance recovery time of the item follows arbitrary distribution 
with density function g(t), and  
 the item can be in one of two states {1,0}, where 1 is up state and 0 is 
down state (Nowakowski & Werbinka, 2009). 
 
B. Phased Mission Modeling Using MFOP and Petri Nets 
Chew, Dunnett, and Andrews (2007) described the use of a Petri net to model 
the reliability of the MFOP under phased-mission scenarios.  By using a form of the 
Monte-Carlo simulation to obtain results, in conjunction with Petri nets modeling 
power, the phased mission model of systems considers various complexities, 
including component failure rate interdependencies, multi-mission periods, and 
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Figure 31. Master Petri Net 
(Chew et al., 2007, p. 227) 
 
Key. The solid line border indicates control of the sequence of phases, and failure or success of each 
mission. The dotted line border indicates the ending of each mission or MFOP and performing 
repairs. The dashed line border indicates the abandoning of the mission due to specific component or 
system failures. 
  
C. Minimum Failure-Free Operating Period Model 
Extending the MFOP model, M. T. Todinov proposed the minimum failure-free 
operating period (MFFOP) as a new reliability measure.  The MFFOP is defined as a 
combination of specified minimum intervals before random variables in a finite time 
interval are guaranteed with a minimum probability PMFFOP (Nowakowski & 
Werbinka, 2009). For example, consider a system comprised of a non-repairable 
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 replacement of a component that is “as good as new” and 
 in a critical event, a “critical repair” leads to a system halt or 
degeneration of the required function below a minimum acceptable 
level and to require an immediate intervention for repair. 
The random failures following a homogeneous Poisson process, minimum 
probability PMFFOP is  
                                 (3) 
where (λa)k	exp(−λa)/k!	is the probability of exactly k failures in the finite time 
interval a,	and	p(S	|k)	=	(1	−	ks/a)k	is the conditional probability that—given k random 
failures—before each failure, there will be a failure-free gap of length of at least s 
(Nowakowski & Werbinka, 2009). 
D. Integrated Logistics Model Using the MFOP 
R. Fritzsche and R. Lasch (2012) developed an integrated logistics model of 
spare parts maintenance planning for the aviation industry using MFOP concepts.  
The authors developed a three-level model for simplified decision support in the 
aviation industry. By dividing the whole planning process into three simpler planning 
sub-areas, network planning complexity was decreased.  In this model, the MFOP 
was used to calculate failure rates of installed components, which could be 
continuously adjusted downwards. The model was designed to support the tactical 
and strategic decisions of an airline, with the ultimate objective of reducing 
unscheduled maintenance events and minimizing total costs. 
The three-level model, as seen in Figure 32, shows the impact of 
maintenance upon the whole network. The model represents the total costs of an 
airline and identifies opportunities for the maximum supply of spare parts at minimal 
costs. It also offers an opportunity for a more efficient use of the components’ 
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Figure 32. Three-Level Model 
(Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 4) 
In the model, three parallel operating levels are connected by flows of 
information and goods.  The first level is the airport/turnaround where aircraft 
departure, flight, and landing occur.  In the second level, repairs such as replacing 
defective components take place.  The third level is the logistics network where 
principally planning and decision processes are made.  Because the first level of the 
model is responsible for movement of aircraft according to the flight plan and 
degrading of failure rates, it is here that all items are checked for their remaining 
MFOP time (Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 4).  If a component does not have enough 
MFOP remaining useful life, the optimal exchange point and location is calculated.  
A message is then forwarded to the logistics network and the aircraft is transferred 
to the repair facility. 
The Fritzsche and Lasch model minimizes the total cost of an airline under a 
preventive maintenance strategy with a dynamic failure rate adjustment.  The 
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(Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 5) 
Fritzsche and Lasch ran a simulation to validate their model. The simulation’s 
objective was to provide continuous availability of spare parts at the lowest cost. 
 Model Validation Through Simulation 
Fritzsche and Lasch’s model compared three maintenance strategies: 
prognostics and health management (PHM) scheduled, PHM time based, and 
unscheduled maintenance. To validate the model, the authors created a simulation 
study involving four airlines based on a real airline flight plan with 45 aircrafts (20 for 
Quantas Airline [QF], nine for Virgin Airlines [VS], seven for Korean Airlines [KE], 
and nine for Thai Airlines [TG]) and four main bases with 10 outstations, as shown in 
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Figure 33. Airline Network Information Used in Simulation 
(Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 5) 
Table 10 lists the data and parameters required to run the simulation. 
Table 10. Simulation Parameters 
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 Simulation Results 
Figure 34 shows the calculated cost of the network, comprised of 
transportation costs, downtime costs, and inventory costs. Under the PHM 
scheduled maintenance strategy, the total costs hardly varied given that strategy 
costs are predictable and projectable. Alternatively, the other two strategies are very 
volatile and result in significantly higher total costs.  Randomly occurring component 
failures result in very high penalty costs and in further delays, or even cancellations, 
of aircraft. The cumulative total costs over the simulated two years amount to $26.4 
million for the unscheduled maintenance strategy, $6.5 million for the PHM 
scheduled strategy, and $29.8 million for the PHM time-based strategy (Fritzsche & 
Lasch, 2012, p. 7). 	
 
Figure 34. Quarterly Calculated Total Costs 
(Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 7) 
The advantages of a preventive maintenance strategy are shown in Figure 
35.  Although the PHM scheduled strategy and the PHM time-based strategy 
generated more overall maintenance actions, it resulted in avoidable unscheduled 
maintenance activities. Many unscheduled maintenance events result in associated 
penalty costs, so the overall cost to the airline increases significantly. Under the 
PHM scheduled maintenance scenario, most scheduled maintenance events occur, 
yet there are no additional running costs because required spare parts are already 
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Figure 35. Types of Maintenance Actions 
(Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 8) 
In Figure 36, the results of a reactive maintenance strategy are shown with 
significantly more unscheduled failures.  Under this strategy, installed components 
are used until failure with no prediction of impending failure. 
 
Figure 36. Constituted Aircrafts Cancellations 
(Fritzsche & Lasch, 2012, p. 8) 
The simulation study conducted by Fritzsche and Lasch showed that a well-
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E. Systems Reliability Modeling for Phased Missions Using 
the MFOP 
In 2010, S. Chew investigated the creation of a modeling method to consider 
as many features of systems undergoing both MFOPs and phased missions as 
possible.  Through the use of Petri nets and Monte-Carlo simulation, he presented a 
simple and then a more complex model to deliver MFOP with a high confidence 
level. 
One goal driving this research was to develop methods enabling accurate 
analysis of the MFOP and its applications. In addition, the analysis method should 
allow further insight into as-yet-unforeseen problems that may arise and should 
contribute to assessments into whether the MFOP is a metric that will be useful in 
future applications (Chew, 2010, p. 10). The analysis method must also consider 
multiple phases of missions.  
1. Development of the Simple Model 
The Petri net technique can be used to model a basic MFOP.  Petri nets can 
provide an easier way of predicting system or platform reliability and can be used in 
phased missions.  Chew first developed a model that accounted for reliability 
considerations (i.e., system, component, phase, mission, and MFOP failure; mission 
abandonment; the MRP and component failures affecting the failure rate of another 
component).  
This initial model that Chew developed focused on the simplest MFOP type, 
where one mission is repeated a finite number of times before the MRP.  To develop 
this model, Chew analyzed a simple repetitive mission and MFOP profile containing 
a defined sequence of phases and then used the Markov analysis tool within a 
software program to find the MFOP success and failure rates.  These rates were 
also predicted using the Petri net modeling software after performing 10,000,000 
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Table 11. Results From the Markov Analysis and the Petri Net Model  
(Chew, 2010, p. 135) 
 
As seen in Table 11, the MFOP failure rates produced by the Markov model 
and the Petri net model software show a high degree of correlation. Due to the 
possible repair of C and D only after the third MFOP, the results follow a cycle where 
the MFOP failure probability increases slowly and then returns to the initial level after 
the third MRP (Chew, 2010, p. 135). 
The modeling method was then applied to a larger 10-phase, 10-component 
system. Three missions were performed in each MFOP, and three MFOPs were 
carried out in each simulation.  1,000,000 simulations were performed to reach an 
estimate of the likelihoods of failure of the MFOPs, missions, and phases (Chew, 
2010, p. 136).  The number of simulations, failures, abandonments, and conditional 
failure probabilities for each of the MFOPs and missions are shown in Table 12 while 
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Table 12. MFOP and Mission Failure Results 
(Chew, 2010, p. 138) 
 
Table 13. Phase Failure Results 
(Chew, 2010, p. 139) 
 
Chew then developed a more complex model, which considered multifaceted 
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IX. Conclusions 
The purpose of the research was to understand the potential impact of the 
MFOP on processes, procedures, and costs in acquisition planning.  The research 
team from NPS investigated the MFOP concept and analyzed pilot demonstrations 
previously conducted on four submarines and the USS Iwo Jima.  Based on the 
research, the MFOP could provide life-cycle savings and innovation in system 
sustainment. 
The two DoN demonstrations involving the MFOP exceeded expectations 
with a number of efficiency and cost savings.  In the first ARCI pilot, distance support 
cost savings of a 7:1 ratio was achieved, while in the latter USS Iwo Jima 
demonstration, a 15:1 savings ratio was achieved.  The ARCI pilot also resulted in 
the reduction of open cabinet repairs to sonar systems while on deployment and the 
issue of spare components. In that pilot, open cabinet maintenance while underway 
was virtually eliminated.  Although further research needs to be conducted with 
statistical data that the NPS researchers did not have access to, given the initial 
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Appendix. Future MFOP Model Requirements 
(Pfeiffer, Kanevsky, & Housel, 2010) 
The following outline posits the requirements for a future MFOP model. The 
model was developed with limited inputs from discussions with the sponsor and 
represents a first cut on an improved model. It does not include parameters for 
humidity and heat, which were not specified before the development of the model. 
The model requirements outline is as follows:  
 Modular structure: S = {M1,…, Mn} - functionally mutually independent, 
testable and replaceable units. 
 Prior probabilities: p1,…, pn to find the i-th module immediately 
incorrect. 
 Fi(t) = P(τi  > t), where τi is a moment of the i-th module’s first failure. 
Fi(t) = 1- Fi(t) is the distribution function and fi(t) = F’i(t) is its density 
function. 
 The state of the system is determined by the states of its modules and 
some random factors attributed to the specifics of a failure mode.   
The following is a listing of the formal properties of the system described in 
the preceding outline. 
It is also useful to introduce a failure rate functions φi(t)= fi(t)/Fi(t) in the model, 
which can be interpreted as the probability of almost instantaneous failure after 
failure free work up until moment t, i.e., φi(t)∆t is the probability of a failure during 
time interval (t, t+ ∆t) given that no failure happened prior to moment t. A failure of 
the i-th unit/module is associated with the loss/cost, which is usually measured either 
in dollars or out-of-service (down time) units Ci.   
The test map requirements for the proposed system are as follows: 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 80 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
T: S  {0, 1}    
 Testing of the whole system or its parts is intended to identify the 
states of its units/modules and/or to assess the likelihood of a failure 
during a given time period (e.g., the remaining part of the mission). 
 Execution of T is associated with cost C(T). 
 The ability of a test Tj to detect a “bug” given a single-module Mi 
system is bad is called coverage wji of test Tj on module Mi. Formally: 
P(Tj =1│Mi is bad) = wji 
The following paragraph answers the question, What is the test, and what 
does it do?: 
Effectively test T—more specifically, its result (“Fail”(1) or “Pass”(0))—
changes the probability of the system’s modules’ state into conditional probabilities 
given the test result. Since the test is not free, the following questions arise:  
 What test from the available menu should be applied first? 
 What is the next best test to apply given results of the previous test? 
Scenario  
 System failure is defined as a failure of at least one of its modules. 
Given that the system was operational up until moment (k-1)∆t, 
probability of failure during the following ∆t time interval can be 
computed as  
h(k, ∆t) = 1-∏[1- φi((k-1)∆t)∆t]
k-1 
 The imbedded monitoring and control system carries over an online 
probability of system failure computation at time moments k∆t. The 
system alarm goes off if h(k, ∆t) exceeds its critical value, which was 
set up under tolerable risk considerations.  
 If the alarm is accepted, mandatory testing starts over.  
It is intuitively appealing to go for the best “bang for the buck,” that is, start 
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Reduction of Uncertainty and Cost 
Mathematically, the model translates into a sequential decision process 
driven by the value of the ratio:  
 information acquired by the test/test’s cost  
 information acquired by the test = H(system before test) - H(system 
after test) 
 H stands for entropy        
 entropy H for the system, whose N states have probabilities 
  p1, …, pN is defined as  
H= -∑ pilogpi 
 In our case, probabilities pi are conditional given test results.  
This work is built based on our previous research. We tested the described 
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